Three studies examined 4-and 6-year-olds' concept of death, particularly the components of universality, inevitability, finality, and causality, by focusing on plants. Experiment 1 was an interview in which participants answered questions about the death components for three plant types (a tree, a weed, and a flower). In Expt. 2, children pointed at drawings of plants and artifacts for which they believed the death components apply. Experiment 3 directly compared children's death concept of plants with that of animals. The results of Expts 1-3 showed that 6-year-olds and to some degree 4-year-olds understand the components of death and that these components apply to plants and animals, but not artifacts. However, there were significant differences in their understanding of death across the three different plant types as well as between plants and animals. These results suggest that children have a concept of death that includes plant and animal death, but that important changes take place between the ages of 4 and 6 years.
theless, at latest, by 10 years of age, children have a firm grasp of the death components (e.g. Carey, 1985; Lazar & Torney-Purta, 1991; Speece & Brent, 1984 , 1992 .
One major limitation in the study of the death concept concerns a relative lack of focus on children's reasoning about plants. Most studies of children's understanding of death have focused on humans and animals (Speece & Brent, 1984 , 1992 , for a review). However, a full grasp of death as a biological process requires that it be understood as applying to all biological entities, including plants. (See Carey, 1985 , for a more extended discussion of the importance of plants in assessing biological concepts.) Indeed, plants provide a particularly strong test of whether death is understood in biological terms, because certain aspects of plant physiology run counter to the typical death process in animals. In particular:
(1) some plants are extremely long-lived, such as trees that can live for hundreds or even thousands of years; (2) other plants seem resistant to attempts to kill them, such as weeds, which appear to 'come back to life' after being cut or sprayed with weed killers; (3) plants do not show the same clear lifespan phases as animals (e.g. continuing to grow throughout the life, even after reaching maturity); (4) plants can be kept in a state of suspended animation, both in the case of seeds, and in the case of wilted plants that rejuvenate when watered (e.g. Hornblum, 1978) ; and (5) plants, unlike animals, can have dead portions (e.g. dead leaves or branches) but can still be alive, with other portions of the plant continuing to sprout new growth.
For all of these reasons, children may be tempted to infer that plants are not susceptible to death; yet once death is understood as a truly biological process, then it should be understood as encompassing plants as well as animals, despite the numerous and salient respects in which plant life and death are atypical, relative to animals. This means that we can assess children's construal of death as biological by examining how children reason about plant death. One potential difficulty with this analysis is that children could fail to appreciate that plants die not because they construe death as non-biological, but rather because they view plants as non-biological. Indeed, numerous researchers have found that children do not always report that plants are alive (e.g. Carey, 1985; Hatano et al., 1993; Richards & Siegler, 1986) . However, children's difficulty lies in part with their semantic misinterpretation of the word 'alive'. More recent studies have demonstrated that even preschool children grasp that plants engage in important biological processes, including growth , regrowth and healing in the face of injury (Backscheider, Shatz, & Gelman,1993) , and decomposition (Springer, Ngyuen, & Samaniego, 1996) . Furthermore, preschool children understand that biological causal mechanisms are involved in plant growth (Hickling & Gelman, 1995) and in plant inheritance (Springer & Keil, 1991) . Therefore, the prediction holds that if children understand death as biological, they should extend the death concept to plants.
No studies to date have used plants as the primary method for tapping into children's death concept. Plants have only occasionally been the focus of studies of children's biological concepts. For example, as part of a larger questionnaire, Smeets (1974) asked children with a mental age (MA) and/or chronological age (CA) of 5-7 years and older, 'Can a (plant/animal/artifact) die?' Children answered affirmatively when asked about the plant and animal, but negatively for the artifact. Beveridge and Davies (1983) also asked 5-, 7-and 11-year-olds whether animals, plants and artifacts had several properties of living things such as the abilities to feel, see, hear, breathe, walk, grow, die, fly, think and move. Specifically, when asked whether animals, plants and artifacts 'can die/ cannot die', the majority of 5-year-olds responded correctly. Similarly, Berzonsky (1987) asked 5-and 6-year-olds a life ('Is [object] alive or not alive?') and death ('Can a [object] die or not die?') question about each of the following kinds of objects: animals, plants, and inanimate objects. Berzonsky (1987) found that children answered the questions most correctly for animals and plants and less so for artifacts.
Inagaki and Hatano (1996, Expt 3) examined whether 5-year-olds recognize the commonalities between plants and animals and how they both differ from artifacts. In this study, children were told about various biological processes of animals (e.g. eating, growing, aging, and dying) and were asked if plants and artifacts share these processes with animals. These researchers found that the majority of children correctly answered that plants, but not artifacts, engage in these biological processes.
In all these studies, although children generally seem willing to report that plants die, the studies provide insufficient depth to enable firm conclusions about children's concept of death. Typically, children received only a single question on the topic. It is therefore difficult to understand what children think plant death means, particularly in terms of the four components of inevitability, universality, finality, and causality. A more in-depth study of plants promised to provide a richer, more definitive database concerning children's understanding of death as a biological and coherent concept.
The present studies focused on three types of plants: flowers, trees, and weeds. Plants vary rather dramatically in the physical cues they offer about death. Flowers are fragile, die easily, have brief lifespans, and are physically insubstantial. Trees are sturdy, do not die easily, have long lifespans, and are physically imposing. Weeds are especially interesting because they are individually not very sturdy (like flowers), but they appear to come back to life (although of course they do not really do so). Thus, plants can provide children with evidence about death that is either supportive (e.g., with flowers) or unsupportive (e.g., with trees and weeds) of a biological and coherent concept of death. Specifically, both weeds and trees provide misleading evidence to children, although they are misleading in different ways. We assume that adults are not misled, understanding that the concept of death applies to all three plant types. However, it is unclear whether children have a parallel understanding. The variation among types of plants provides an opportunity to examine this issue.
Children aged 4 and 6 years were the focus of these studies, because converging evidence suggests that this is the earliest age range in which children have begun to understand plants as biological entities. This evidence carries considerable weight and suggests that children may also develop the concept of plant death during this age. In order to examine this possibility, children in Expt 1 were interviewed about inevitability, universality, finality and causality for flowers, weeds and trees. Experiment 2 examined children's knowledge that death is only applicable to living things. Thus, children were asked to point to pictures of artifacts and plants for which the death components apply. Finally, Expt 3 compared children's plant and animal death concepts. Similar to Expt 2, Expt 3 was a picture-pointing task that included plant, artifact, and animal stimuli.
EXPERIMENT 1
Here, the extent to which children have a coherent and biological concept of death was examined. If children have such a concept, they should understand:
(1) that death applies to plants; (2) that all four components of death apply; and (3) that death applies equally to all plant types (flowers, trees, weeds).
In contrast, if children have a non-biological or incoherent understanding of death, then they may either deny that plants can die or apply the death concept only partially to a subset of the death components and/or to a subset of the plant types tested.
Method

Participants
A sample of 30 4-year-olds (M = 4;6 yrs, range = 4;0-4;11 yrs, 10 girls and 20 boys) and 20 6-year-olds (M = 6;1 yrs, range = 5;9-6;9 yrs, 10 girls and 10 boys) were recruited from four university-sponsored schools located in the Midwestern USA. In addition, 16 adults (eight men and eight women) were recruited from an undergraduate psychology course at a university in the Midwestern USA to perform a paper and pencil version of the study. The adults' responses were used as a developmental end-point against which to compare children's responses. Overall, participants were from culturally diverse, middle-class backgrounds.
Materials
There were two sets of questions; each set was asked for a flower, weed, and tree. A pilot study using photographs of plants confirmed that children were able to point to relevant pictures of flowers, trees and weeds. Thus, we were confident that children were familiar with these plant types. However, we did not include photographs of plants in the current experiment so that children would not search for clues in the photograph itself (e.g., looking to see if the plant's leaves were wilted). The first set of questions consisted of descriptive questions about death derived from studies reviewed by Speece and Brent (1984 , 1992 (1) 'Do you think a flower [weed, tree] will ever die, or do you think a flower [weed, tree] will live forever and ever? Why?' (2) 'Does a flower [weed, tree] Question 1 tested the inevitability component, question 2 tested the universality component, and question 3 tested the finality component. Note that 'have to' is a modal expression that is used by children by age 3 years, and so was presumably intelligible by the 4-and 6-year-olds in this study (Shatz & Wilcox, 1991) . The second set of questions consisted of causal questions concerning the causes of death:
(1) 'Could a flower [weed, tree] Hickling & Gelman, 1995) .
Procedure
Children were asked two sets of questions, descriptive and causal, about a flower, weed and tree. Descriptive questions always preceded causal questions because the latter presupposed that plants die. The specific plants and question items within each set of questions were presented in one of two random orders.
Results
Descriptive questions: inevitability, universality, and finality We analysed the descriptive and causal questions separately. The 'yes/no' responses for the descriptive questions were coded for correctness. Correct responses to these questions were considered to be:
(1 Note that the two halves of each question were treated as one question because children rarely, if ever, answered both halves. So, correct and incorrect responses were assigned scores of 1 and 0, respectively. If participants provided an incorrect 'yes/no' answer, but a correct, open-ended response (e.g., 'No, the flower won't stay dead forever because [the flowering plant] grows another one'), a score of .5 was granted. This occurred less than 1% of the time for both children and adults. A 3 (age: 4-year-olds, 6-year-olds, adults) 6 3 (plant type: flower, weed, tree) 6 3 (component: universality, inevitability, finality) ANOVA was conducted on these data. The dependent measure was the accuracy score (0 or 1), as described above. The results showed that age affected the understanding of the components: there was a main effect of age, but not of plant type or component (F(2,63) = 14.73, MSE = .19, p < .01). Figure 1 illustrates that adults and 6-year-olds had a higher percentage of correct answers than 4-year-olds. A Tukey post hoc test showed a significant difference between adults and 4-year-olds and between 6-year-olds and 4-year-olds (ps < .05), but none between adults and 6-year-olds.
However, age affected each of the components differently as shown in an interaction between age and component (F(4,126) = 3.83, MSE = .11, p < .01). Figure 1 illustrates that adults and 6-year-olds had a higher percentage of correct answers than 4-year-olds for the inevitability and the universality components. However, adults had more correct answers than both 6-year-olds and 4-year-olds for the finality component.
As predicted, the results showed that participants' correct answers for the components were somewhat influenced by plant type. There was a significant interaction between plant type and component (F(4,252) = 4.48, MSE = .11, p < .01). Figure 2 illustrates that the percentage of participants' correct answers for the inevitability component was equivalent across plant types (flower, tree, weed). This was also the case for the universality component. However, the percentage of correct answers for the finality component was markedly higher for a flower than for a weed. comparison indicated that a weed differed significantly from a flower for the finality component (p < .05), but that trees did not differ significantly from the other two.
In addition to the ANOVA, participants' answers were compared to chance (.5). Overall, 4-year-olds were above chance on the finality component only, whereas 6-yearolds and adults were above chance on all three components (ps < .05).
Causal questions
Next, the causal questions were analyzed. 'Yes/no' responses were coded for correctness using the same scheme as with the descriptive questions (namely, each correct response was scored as 1; each incorrect response was scored as 0). Correct responses were 'yes' to the following items: 'got very sick', 'didn't get enough sunshine and water', 'person picked/chopped it', and 'got very old.' Correct responses were also 'no' to the 'wanted to' and 'need a person' questions. A 3 (age: 4-year-olds, 6-year-olds, adults) 6 3 (plant type: flower, weed, tree) ANOVA was then conducted on these data. The dependent measure was the number of correct responses (potentially ranging from 0 to 6). There was not a main effect of plant type, and no significant interactions. The only significant result was a main effect of age, (F(2,63) = 10.69, MSE = 2.10, p < .01). Figure 1 illustrates that adults and 6-year-olds provided a higher percentage of correct answers than 4-year-olds. A Tukey post hoc test showed that 4-year-olds differed significantly from 6-year-olds and adults, (p < .05), but that 6-year-olds and adults did not differ significantly. Both groups of children and adults were above chance (3.0) on the causality questions, (ps < .01).
Response patterns
In order to gain an overall picture of the data, we created three response patterns by summing participants' answers for the descriptive and causal questions. Participants with 19 or more correct answers out of a total of 27 questions were categorized as consistently accurate. This response level was determined as significantly above chance by binomial probability (p < .05). Consistent accuracy was found in 53% (N = 16) of the 4-year-olds, 85% (N = 17) of the 6-year-olds and 100% (N = 16) of the adults. Participants with nine or fewer correct answers were categorized as consistently inaccurate. Only 4%of the 4-year-olds (N = 1) and none of the 6-year-olds or adults were consistently inaccurate. Participants with between 18 and 10 correct answers were categorized as having no clear response pattern, which was found in 43%(N = 13) of the 4-year-olds, 15% (N = 3) of the 6-year-olds and none of the adults.
Discussion
The goal of Expt 1 was to examine whether children have a coherent and biological understanding of death, applicable to plants, extending to all four components of death and equally pertinent to flowers, trees and weeds, despite the variation in their external cues to death. The answer, based on the results of Expt 1, is 'yes' by age 6 years, but 'no' (or, at best, 'partially') at age 4 years. Similar to adults, 6-year-olds readily assert that plants die; apply the death concept broadly to the components of inevitability, university, and finality; and accurately appreciate the biological causes of death. They also generally appreciate that trees as well as flowers undergo death, although there is some tendency to treat death in weeds as less final. In contrast, 4-year-olds have a good understanding of finality and causality, but not of universality or inevitability. These results differ from those of Carey (1985) in that we found a change in the understanding of death between 4-and 6-year-olds, in contrast to Carey's finding of a change between 6-and 10-year-olds. Our results are consistent with those of Slaughter, Jaakkola, and Carey (1999) , who found changes between 4 and 6 years of age in children's understanding of death as it relates to the concepts of life and bodily function.
The influence of plant type on children's understanding of plant death also bears on the issue of coherence. We found that children's concept of death varied as a function of plant type. Results of Expt 1 indicate that plant type affects judgments of finality. Adults and both groups of children report that the death of a flower is more final than the death of a weed; the death of a tree is intermediate. This differential understanding of the finality component would seem to reflect the cues and experience that children receive from plants. For example, once a flower begins to die, it loses its petals, wilts, shrivels up and seldom comes back to life. However, once a weed dies, it often appears to return to life in vast numbers. Trees, which do not die as readily or as quickly as flowers and weeds, provide less input about the finality component. The influence of plant type on judgments of finality suggests that children-and surprisingly even adults-do not have a fully coherent construal of death. In contrast, the lack of influence of plant type on the judgments of inevitability, universality and causality suggests a somewhat coherent understanding by 4 years of age.
Before accepting this interpretation of the results, we wished to replicate the study with converging evidence. One limitation of Expt 1 was that we included only a single item regarding each plant type/component combination. A way to look more closely at the plant 6 component interaction is to ask children about several examples of flowers, weeds and trees, not just about a single flower, weed, and tree as in Expt 1. Experiment 2 was designed to this end.
EXPERIMENT 2
This was designed to provide additional evidence regarding children's understanding of death in different plant types. Children in Expt 2 participated in a task that entailed pointing to drawings of flowers, weeds, and trees for which the death components apply. These drawings were included to see if the influence of plant type would hold up when children were asked about several examples of each plant type.
Experiment 2 also included distracter drawings of artifacts so that we could distinguish between correct responding and a bias to point to each picture. The inclusion of artifacts thus afforded the opportunity to examine children's knowledge that death is applicable to living things, but not non-living things. Research has demonstrated that children distinguish living things and artifacts. For example, Inagaki and Hatano (1996) found that 4-to 6-year-olds know that plants and animals grow (i.e., increase in size over time) whereas artifacts do not.
The final way that Expt 2 differed from Expt 1 was that it combined the components of universality and inevitability to fit the picture-pointing task. That is, the pictures that children pointed to when asked about the inevitability of death would presumably be an indication of how universal children view death to be. Speece and Brent (1984 , 1992 have suggested that these components are interrelated and are often used interchangeably among researchers. Originally, in Expt 1 the inevitability question was 'Do you think a flower [weed, tree] will ever die, or do you think a flower [weed, tree] will live forever and ever?', whereas the universality question was 'Does a flower [weed, tree] have to die, or can a flower [weed, tree] live forever?' These questions were reformulated into the following directions for Expt 2: 'Point to the ones that will have to die later on.' Experiment 2 was designed to answer three questions. As in Expt 1, the first two questions were whether children apply the death concepts to plants, and whether children respond differentially to flowers, weeds, and trees. The third question was whether children know that death is applicable only to living things.
Method
Participants A sample of 17 4-year-olds (M = 4;6 yrs, range = 4;2-5;1 yrs, 10 boys and 7 girls), 20 6-year-olds (M = 6.5 yrs, range = 6;0-6;9 yrs, 11 boys and 9 girls) and 30 adults (M = 19;4 yrs, range = 17;7-24;5 yrs, 17 males and 13 females) participated in Expt 2. The children were recruited from local and university-sponsored schools. The adults were recruited from an undergraduate psychology course at a university in the Midwestern USA. The participants were from culturally diverse, middle-class backgrounds.
Materials
There were three sets of colour drawings of different plants and artifacts. The plant drawings did not provide any cues about death (e.g., wilted leaves). The first set included a flower, weed, tree, telephone, kite, and guitar. The second set included a flower, weed, tree, fork, keys, and ball. The third set included a flower, weed, tree, pencil, crayons, and paints. Each set of drawings also included an empty box.
Accompanying the drawings were two sets of directions adapted from Expt 1 to fit the picture-pointing task in Expt 2. The first set of directions was descriptive: 'Point to the ones that will have to die later on' (universality/inevitability) and 'Point to the ones that stay dead after they die' (finality). The second set of directions was causal: 'Point to the ones that could die if a person hurt them'; 'Point to the ones that could die because they got sick'; 'Point to the ones that could die if they didn't get enough food and water'; 'Point to the ones that could die if they got very old'; 'Point to the ones that need a person to make them die'; and 'Point to the ones that could die if they wanted to'. Also, filler statements such as 'Point to the ones that can get broken' and 'Point to the ones that have polka-dots' were interspersed randomly among the aforementioned statements. The filler statements were included so that plants were not always the correct answer and so that artifacts would be selected as well. These filler directions were excluded from subsequent analyses because they were not of theoretical interest. Children were also told that they could select the empty box if none of the pictures were satisfactory.
Procedure
Children were interviewed individually by a researcher, whereas adults were administered a paper-and-pencil version of the study in a large group. The interview began by the researcher labelling each of the drawings in each set and asking the child to repeat the name after her. Children were then told that they would need to follow directions by pointing to the drawings in front of them. Children were told that if none of the drawings satisfied the directions then they would need to point to the empty box. Next, to ensure that children understood the directions, they were given two warm-up directions (i.e., 'Point to the ones that have green in them' and 'Point to the ones that have red in them'). After the warm-up, children were presented with the descriptive directions followed by the causal directions. Each set of directions was given for all three sets of drawings. The drawing sets and individual directions within the descriptive and causal sets were presented in one of two random orders.
Results
Plants only
Experiment 2 was designed to follow up the two questions from Expt 1, namely whether children apply death to plants and whether this application differs according to plant type. Thus, the first wave of analyses looked at the plants separately from artifacts.
Descriptive items A score of 1 was assigned to every plant selection participants made on the descriptive items. These scores were then summed over the three sets of drawings. A3 (age: 4-yearolds, 6-year-olds, adults) 6 3 (plant type: flowers, weeds, trees) 6 2 (component: universality/inevitability, finality) ANOVA was then conducted on these data. The dependent measure was the plant selection score, potentially ranging from 0 to 3 for each plant type. Overall, adults (M = 2.55, SD = .66) made more selections than 6-yearolds (M = 2.09, SD = .76) and 4-year-olds (M = 1.98, SD = .77), as demonstrated by a main effect of age, (F(2,64) = 3.76, MSE = 3.12, p < .05). There was a significant difference between the adults' and 4-year-olds' selections only, (p < .05, by a Tukey post hoc test). There was no difference between 4-and 6-year-olds or between the 6-year-olds and adults. The ANOVA also showed no main effect of plant type or component, and no plant type 6 component interaction.
Participants' selections across plant types were also compared to chance (4.5) for each of the components. Six-year-olds and adults were all above chance on their selections for each of the universality/inevitability and finality components (ps < .05). Four-year-olds were above chance on the finality component, (p < .05), but not on the universality/inevitability component (p = .09).
Causal items
A score of 1 was assigned to the plant selections on the 'got very sick', 'didn't get enough sunshine and water', 'person picked/chopped it', and 'got very old' items. The 'wanted to' and 'need a person' items were reverse coded such that a 71 was assigned to them. A 3 (age: 4-year-olds, 6-year-olds, adults) 6 3 (plant type: flowers, weeds, trees) ANOVA was conducted on these data. The dependent measure was the sum of the scores on the causal items, potentially ranging from 76 to +12 for each plant type. Adults (M = 9.35, SD = 2.60) made more plant selections than 6-year-olds (M = 4.55, SD = 2.15) and 4-year-olds (M = 3.23, SD = 2.93), as demonstrated by a main effect of age, (F(2,64) = 37.19, MSE = 17.66, p < .01). There was a significant difference between 4-year-olds and adults, and between 6-year-olds and adults, but not between 4-and 6-year-olds, (p < .05, by a Tukey post hoc test). Also, participants made more appropriate selections of flowers (M = 6.70, SD = 3.84) and trees (M = 7.01, SD = 3.74) than of weeds (M = 5.30, SD = 4.15), as revealed by a main effect of plants (F(2,128) = 13.92, MSE = 3.13, p < .01). A Tukey post hoc test showed flowers and trees differed significantly from weeds (p < .05), but there was no difference between flowers and trees. There was no interaction between age and plant type.
Participants' selections across plant types were also compared to chance (3). Fouryear-olds, 6-year-olds, and adults were above chance for the causal items (ps < .01).
Plants vs. artifacts
Experiment 2 was also designed to examine whether children understand that death applies to plants, but not to artifacts. Thus, the second wave of analyses compared plants and artifacts. The empty box was excluded from these analyses because its selection was rare.
Descriptive items
For the second wave of analyses, participants received a score of 1 for each plant selection and 1 for each artifact selection. These choices were summed for each of the components across the picture sets. A 3 (age: 4-year-olds, 6-year-olds, adults) 6 2 (object: plants, artifacts) 6 2 (component: universality/inevitability, finality) ANOVA was conducted. The dependent measure was the total number of object selections of a given object type, potentially ranging from 0 to 9. Participants reported that the components of death apply more often to plants (M = 6.81, SD = 2.24) than artifacts (M = .30, SD = .77), as seen in a main effect of object, (F(1,64) = 439.26, MSE = 5.69, p < .01). This main effect was also mediated by an interaction between age and object, (F(2,64) = 4.68, MSE = 5.69, p < .05). Figure 3 demonstrates that adults selected more plants than 4-and 6-year-olds. In contrast, 4-year-olds selected more artifacts than adults and 6-year-olds. Figure 3 also demonstrates that the selection of plants was higher than the selection of artifacts within each age group considered separately (ps < .05). There was no main effect of age or component, nor were there any other significant interactions.
Causal items
The same coding strategy from the plants-only causal items analysis was used in the present analysis. In particular, plant selections received a score of 1, except for the 'wanted to' and 'need a person' items, which received a score of 71. Artifact selections received a score of 1 for all items. This strategy was employed so that plant selections became correct answers whereas artifact selections were incorrect answers. A3 (age: 4-year-olds, 6-year-olds, adults) 6 2 (object: plants, artifacts) ANOVA was conducted on the causal items. The dependent variable was the sum of the scores on the causal items, potentially ranging from 718 to +36 for plants and 0 to 54 for artifacts. Figure 3 demonstrates that adults selected more plants than 6-and 4-year-olds. In contrast, 4-year-olds made more artifact selections than 6-year-olds and adults. Figure 3 also demonstrates that the selection of plants was higher than the selection of artifacts within each age group considered separately (ps < .05).
Response patterns
To gain a sense of the overall data, we created three response patterns by summing participants ' plant selections for the descriptive and causal questions. Participants with 34 or more plant selections out of a total of 54 possible correct plant selections were categorized as consistently accurate. This response level was determined as significantly above chance by binomial probability (p < .05). Consistent accuracy was found in 6% (N = 1) of the 4-year-olds, 25% (N = 5) of the 6-year-olds, and 87% (N = 26) of the adults. Participants with 16 or fewer plant selections were categorized as consistently inaccurate, which was found in 29% (N = 5) of the 4-year-olds, 15% (N = 3) of the 6-year-olds and none of the adults. Finally, participants with between 33 and 17 plant selections were categorized as having no clear response pattern, which was found in 65%(N = 11) of the 4-year-olds, 60%(N = 12) of the 6-year-olds, and 13%(N = 4) of the adults.
Discussion
First, Expt 2 provides additional support for the finding in Expt 1 that children generally apply the death components to plants, but that this understanding improves substantially between 4 and 6 years of age. Experiment 2 showed that 6-year-olds and adults understand the universality/inevitability, finality, and causality components of death. Four-year-olds also understand the finality and causality components, but not so much the universality/inevitability component. Also as in Expt 1, we found differences in performance depending upon plant type, although the specifics differ somewhat from the results of Expt 1, which found that children and adults think that finality (but not the other components) applies most often to 'a flower' and least often to 'a weed', whereas 'a tree' is intermediate. In contrast, Expt 2 showed an influence of plant type on the causality component. Children and adults reported flowers and trees could die from various causes more often than weeds could. This finding suggests that children-and even adults, surprisingly-think that weeds are less vulnerable than flowers and trees to the causes of death. Although the specific components differ between the two experiments, the plant that poses the greatest challenge to children's acquisition of the death components is the same, namely weeds.
Second, Expt 2 demonstrates that children understand that death is applicable to plants, but not artifacts. Children in both age groups reported that plants, unlike artifacts, have to die and remain dead and that their death is instigated by several causes. This result is consistent with research that suggests 4-to 6-year-olds' ability to distinguish living from non-living things based on biological processes (e.g., Inagaki & Hatano, 1996) .
EXPERIMENT 3
As a summary, we have seen in Expt 1 that 6-year-olds understand all of the death components and 4-year-olds understand some of the components as they pertain to plants. We have also seen in Expt 2 that children understand that death is relevant to plants only, but not to artifacts. In addition, some differences were found between plant types, with weeds understood less well than flowers and trees in both experiments. A question that arises is how these findings with plants compare to those with animals. Presumably, if children are committed to their understanding of the death concept, they should apply the death components similarly across plants and animals. Children in Expt 3 participated in a picture-pointing task with plants, artifacts, and animals.
Method
Participants A sample of 19, 4-year-olds (M = 4;6 yrs, range = 4;1-5;1 yrs, 10 girls and 9 boys), 20, 6-year-olds (M = 6;0 yrs, range = 5;2-6;2 yrs, 8 girls and 12 boys) and 30 adults (M = 20 yrs, range = 18-26 yrs, 16 women and 14 men) participated in this study. The children were recruited from local schools; the adults were recruited from an undergraduate introductory course in psychology at a university in the Midwestern USA. Participants were from predominantly middle-class, culturally diverse backgrounds.
Materials and procedures
Materials and procedures were identical to those in Expt 2, except that the three sets of coloured drawings included plants, artifacts, and animals. These drawings did not include cues about death (e.g., wilted leaves). The first set included a tree, flower, kite, fork, ant, and bird. The second set included a weed, tree, pencil, keys, monkey, and turtle. The third set included a weed, flower, guitar, phone, bee, and elephant. Each set of drawings also included an empty box.
Results
Descriptive items: universality/inevitability and finality
The descriptive items were analysed by first assigning a score of 1 to each plant, animal, and artifact selection. These scores were than summed for each of the components by object type. A 3 (age: 4-year-olds, 6-year-olds, and adults) 6 2 (component: universality/ inevitability and finality) 6 3 (object: plant, artifact, and animal) ANOVA was conducted on these data. The dependent measure was the object selection score, potentially ranging from 0 to 6. A main effect of age demonstrated that adults selected more objects (M = 3.26, SD = .76) than 4-year-olds (M = 2.21, SD = .78) and 6-yearolds (M = 2.25, SD = .81); F(2,66) = 12.77, MSE = 3.68, p < .01. A Tukey post hoc test revealed that there was a significant difference between adults and 4-year-olds, and between adults and 6-year-olds, but not between the two groups of children (p < .05). Participants had more animal (M = 4.26, SD = 1.92) than plant (M = 3.32, SD = 1.67) se le c tions, and more p lant than artifac t se le c tions ( M = .50 , SD = .9 3); F(2,132) = 104.40, MSE = 4.34, p < .01; pairwise comparisons were conducted by Tukey post hoc tests (p < .05). However, this main effect was mediated by an interaction between age and object (F(4,132) = 4.30, p < .01). Table 1 shows that adults selected more plants than 4-and 6-year-olds. Adults also selected more animals than 4-and 6-year-olds. Yet adults, 6-year-olds, and 4-year-olds did not differ on their artifact selections. Table 1 also shows that the selection of plants and animals was higher than the selection of artifacts within each age group considered separately (ps < .05). There was no significant difference between the plant and animal selections for 4-year-olds or for adults. However, there was a significant difference between the plant and animal selections for 6-year-olds (p < .05).
Participants' plant and animal selections for each of the components were also compared to chance (3). Only adults were above chance on their plant and animal selections for the inevitability/universality and the finality components (ps < .05).
Causal items
As with the descriptive items, a score of 1 was assigned to each plant, animal, and artifact selection. However, the 'wanted to' and 'need a person' items were reverse coded for the plants and animals such that they received a 71 score. Thus, plant and animal selections were accurate, but artifact selections were inaccurate. These scores were then summed across each of the causal items for each object. We then conducted a 3 (age: 4-year-olds, 6-year-olds and adults) 6 3 (object: plant, animal, and artifact) analysis for the causal items. The dependent measure was the summed object selection score, potentially ranging from 712 to +24 for the plants and animals and 0 to 36 for the artifacts. There was a main effect of age, in which adults (M = 12.73, SD = 2.94) selected more objects than 4-year-olds (M = 5.03, SD = 2.82) and 6-year-olds (M = 5.4, SD = 2.74); F(2,66) = 40.09, MSE = 28.17, p < .01. A Tukey post hoc test indicated that there was a significant difference between adults and 4-year-olds, between adults and 6-year-olds, but no difference between the two groups of children (p < .05). Participants also selected more animals (M = 12.60, SD = 6.35) than plants (M = 11.40, SD = 8.68 ) and more plants than artifacts (M = 1.44, SD = 3.62); F(2,132) = 77.36, MSE = 28.08, p < .01; pairwise comparisons were conducted by Tukey post hoc tests (p < .05). This main effect was also qualified by an interaction between object and age (F(4,132) = 12.63, MSE = 28.08, p < .01). Table 1 reveals that adults selected more plants and animals than 4-and 6-year-olds. However, adults, 6-year-olds, and 4-year-olds did not differ in their artifact selections. Selection of plants and animals was higher than the selection of artifacts within each age group considered separately (ps < .05). There was also a significant difference between animal and plant selections for 4-year-olds as well as for 6-year-olds (p < .05). Yet there was no significant difference between the plant and animal selections for adults.
Participants' plant and animal selections were also compared to chance (6). Fouryear-olds were not above chance on either their plant or animal selections. Six-year-olds were only above chance on their animal selections, whereas adults were significantly above chance on their plant and animal selections (ps < .05).
Response patterns
In order to gain a sense of the overall data, we created three response patterns by combining the descriptive and causality items. Participants with 44 or more (out of 72) correct plant and animal selections were considered consistently accurate. This category was above chance according to binomial probability theory (p < .05). Consistent accuracy was found in 26% (N = 5) of the 4-year-olds, 30% of (N = 6) of the 6-year-olds and 90% (N = 27) of the adults. Participants with between 43 and 27 plant and artifact selections were considered as having an unclear response pattern, which was found in 42%(N = 8) of the 4-year-olds, 50%(N = 10) of the 6-year-olds, and 10% (N = 3) of the adults. Finally, participants with 26 or fewer plant and animal selections were considered consistently inaccurate, which was found in 32%(N = 6) of the 4-year-olds, 20% (N = 4) of the 6-year-olds, and none of the adults.
Discussion
The main question posed by Expt 3 was how children's understanding of death compares for plants and animals. The results provide a complex answer to this question. On the whole, children selected animals more often than plants. This finding did not emerge at both child age groups for every component; nonetheless, an advantage for animals emerged in several of the comparisons, and none of the comparisons showed an advantage for plants. This advantage may have been due in part to at least two reasons.
First, the results are not too surprising given the several ways that plants differ from animals with respect to death, as detailed in the introduction. Plants, but not animals, vary dramatically in the physical evidence they provide about death. Plants may pose a challenge for children acquiring an understanding of death, in that trees are sturdy and long-lived, and weeds appear to be indestructible. In addition, plants, unlike animals, continue to grow throughout life and so do not have an identifiable 'old age'; they can have dead portions (e.g. dead leaves or branches) but still can be alive; and plants can appear dead or dormant in the winter and then 'come back to life' in the spring. Hornblum (1978) suggested that the death concept may be difficult to acquire for plants because children have often witnessed a wilted plant appear to come back to life after being watered. Such an experience may suggest to children that plants do not die.
Second, the higher selection of animals may be found because children consider them to be more salient or typical examples of living things and therefore more salient or typical examples of things that die (because only living things can die). After all, animals lose salient features of both sound and motion when they die, whereas plants lose neither. Thus, when children are presented with plants, animals, and artifacts, perhaps their attention is drawn away from plants and towards animals as living things that die. This issue of salience may explain in part why children's performance was below chance with plants and animals in Expt 3. Recall that when plants and animals were not pitted against each other, and plants were the only living things in the picture sets, 6-year-olds' and partially 4-year-olds' performance was above chance in Expt 2.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present series of studies provides one of the first in-depth investigations of what young children know about death, particularly as it applies to plants. A truly coherent and biological understanding of death would include an appreciation of the following:
(1) All biological entities must die, including plants-despite the numerous respects in which plant life and death differ from animal life and death. (2) Death comes to all types of plants, even trees (which are sturdy and long-lasting) and weeds (which appear to come back to life). (3) Death includes the components of universality, inevitability, finality and causality.
Traditionally, past research has not focused on plant death because of the assumption that children do not understand that plants are alive (e.g. Carey, 1985; Hatano et al., 1993; Richards & Siegler, 1986) . Studies have typically included a single question on plant death (e.g. Berzonsky, 1987; Beveridge & Davies, 1983; Inagaki & Hatano, 1996; Smeets, 1974) . However, recent research has shown that children understand that plants, like animals, are biological entities, and that this understanding is organized around a naO ve theory of biology (Backscheider, et al., 1993; Hickling & Gelman, 1995; Keil, 1994; Springer & Keil, 1991; Springer et al., 1996) . The current series of studies examines children's understanding of death in the context of this body of research that suggests that children recognize plants as biological entities subject to biological processes.
We focused on plants by asking multiple questions about different plant types. We suggested that plants enable a strong test of whether children understand the concept of death. The fact that plants vary in the type of evidence they provide about death afforded us the opportunity to test the strength of children's commitment to the components of death.
Experiment 1 showed that between the ages of 4 and 6 years, children develop an understanding that the components of death apply to plants. Experiment 2 also showed that 4-and 6-year-olds know that these components are applicable only to living things, but not non-living things such as artifacts. Finally, a comparison between plants and animals in Expt 3 suggested that the understanding of death is somewhat more sophisticated for animals than plants. Taken together, these results suggest that between 4 and 6 years of age, children are developing a concept of death that applies to plants and animals, but not to artifacts. Slaughter et al. (1999) have also found that important changes in children's understanding of death occur during this age range.
Although children have much understanding of death by 4 years of age, they do not view death in a wholly biological way, as applicable to all living things equally. Instead, death is understood differently for different plant types, and differently for plants vs. animals. Plants vary dramatically from one another in the physical evidence they offer about death: flowers appear fragile, trees appear sturdy, and weeds appear to come back to life after death. Both Expts 1 and 2 revealed that plant type to some extent does affect participants' understanding of the death components. In Expt 1, the finality component was understood better for flowers and trees, but worse for weeds. Similarly, in Expt 2, the causality component was understood better for flowers and trees, but worst for weeds. Furthermore, children apply the death concepts more readily to animals than plants (Expt 3).
These results are consistent with past research suggesting that children's understanding of death may vary as a function of entity type. For example, Orbach, Gross, Glaubman, & Berman (1985) found that human death is understood better than animal death by children as young as 6 years of age. Berzonsky (1987) also found that 5-and 6-year-olds are more accurate in their judgments about the death concept for animals than for inanimate objects. Overall, then, these results suggest that young children do not have a fully biological construal of death, as they apply the death concept inconsistently to different types of entities. What is most surprising is that adults, too, show some variability in their application of death.
Overall, the results of the present studies suggest that children acquire the components of death at different points in development and that these components are also understood differently for varying plant types and differently between plants and animals. How might children develop a coherent concept of death? Although this important question awaits further investigation, we speculate young children's everyday experiences and interactions with plants and animals lead to an initial understanding of death. Certainly this initial understanding is limited in many ways (e.g., including one or two components, applying to only some living things). However, one way children may overcome this limitation is by drawing inferences from one living thing to another. For example, knowing that an animal is subject to death may allow children to infer that a plant, also a living thing capable of some of the same processes (such as growth and healing), can be subject to death. Much research has demonstrated that children are adept at extending their existing knowledge by drawing inferences from a familiar to an unfamiliar instance of a category or concept (see Heit, 2000, for a review) . Through this process children may lay the groundwork for a coherent and biological concept of death. Future research will examine the specific processes by which children develop a coherent and biological understanding of death.
